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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

21 August 1963
AFH/D/TECH/OSA/DD/S&T

SUBJECT: Unique Assets of the Agency in Collection Equipment Procurement

1. Introduction

A brief survey of the history development of airborne and satellite photographic reconnaisance systems, and the reactions of people to these, show that the CIA has some methods of operation and procurement that give the Agency a unique status in the field. As a result of this status, dhe AF is currently using our contracting and security facility on some of their programs, and is in many ways attempting to duplicate techniques of the Agency. The following is an attempt to define the characteristics which are now so sought after; this definition is necessary for two purposes: first, so that we can ourselves retain this capability; second, so that partial application by ourselves or others does not lead to disastrous situations (e.g., one can take an excellent pudding recipe, and bake it like a cake; result--garbage). Most of my familiarity with the techniques and methods associated with technical developments come from the contractors facility, only a small amount from experience within the Agency.

2. Comments

First aspect of interest in Agency developments is the quick reaction time for the initiation of development of a system. Noticeable is the lack of full staff studies, feasibility programs, development plans, engineering analyses, etc. Rather, one sees the following activity: first, a qualitative establishment of a need; second, a broad-brush definition of a possible way to fill that need; third, obtaining a proposal from a capable contractor; fourth, evaluation of the course of action by a very limited group of very capable people (e.g. Land-Baker-Purcell); and fifth, the initiation of work with a minimum of redtape. Some risks are taken on cost; the work-statement is often ill-defined (possibly containing some questionable items). The work is initiated, and many of these factors are ironed out as the work progresses. An active and determined attempt is made to maintain security by strict control of information and limitation on numbers of people involved.

In addition, active authority is delegated to the operating level. Most decisions can be made immediately; a long chain of government approvals are not generally required. Rather, the superiors are kept informed, and can therefor re-direct if necessary.

NRO review(s) completed.

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2. (cont).

However, the initiation of action can occur immediately. This authority delegation also occurs at the contractor level as well; action is started in the direction of best estimate, consultations occur after work is under way, or at least people have actively started to solve the problem. Occasionally, this leads to rather expensive rework or redirection; generally the effort gets done very much sooner.

Documentation is minimal. Progress reporting is done directly by personal contact with necessary people; formally edited documents, and well-prepared briefing charts are not required. Unfortunately, this requires a lot of traveling, both by the government and by the contractors. The pace of activity is fast, on the spot decisions need to be made (which requires on-the-spot authority): there is no requirement to await the writing, editing, printing, transmission, approval chain, for either reports or system changes. As a disadvantage, it is often difficult to state, two years later, why something was done: often, even to state what was done.

3. Current Status and Case History

The CORONA program is, I believe, a good case history of the initiation of development under this method of operation, and of the slow (and inevitable?) degradation of the method. CORONA was started initially as a short-term, high-risk development, to fill in the community's needs during the development of SAMOS (the AF "white" reconnaisance satellite program), then falling behind schedule. A small, competent team was assembled, and work initiated. Additional people were brought in as needed. All concerned were expected to contribute in any way they could, cutting across disciplines and fields of interest. By keeping the groups small, communications were maintained without resort to a large amount of paperwork. Some mistakes were made; however, early flights were possible, and some basic faults were uncovered which could not have been uncovered without the flight experience. The life of the program was extended; year by year, more people became involved, and, as an operational system, tighter controls have been imposed. The complexity and capability of the flight gear has steadily increased; as simple items have proven out, additional requirements have arisen.

The CORONA system has been developed with one basic ground rule: keep it simple, to do the required task, and not try to do the "optimum" task; the optimum can be approached, but is more important to get the job done, than to do all jobs for all people.

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This memorandum for the record outlines the questions raised by DCI concerning the above subjects.

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The basic purposes of the agreement dated March 13, 1963 should be recognized as the creation of a management organization to handle the NRO under the following broad understanding expressed in the Agreement.

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Appropriate capabilities, facilities and resources of the DoD and the CIA will be used on all flights over denied territory (III-D).

Appropriate resources of DoD, CIA and private contractors should be used in the planning and conduct of research and development of future reconnaissance programs (III-H).

The DNRO is granted authority to carry out the National Reconnaissance Program through the assignment of all project tasks such as technical management, contracting, etc., to appropriate elements of DoD and CIA (IV-C).

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It was DCI's understanding that NRO would be a managing and planning organization utilizing existing resources but would not attempt to become a line organization duplicating existing resources, most particularly those in the Air Force and CIA. However, NRO has become a "line organization" and as a result has taken over operational responsibility. The Air Force Systems Command (General Schriever) is no longer involved and General Greer reports directly to the DNRO. Thus the NRP has lost the input of this organization. Similarly the Satellite Operations Center has been made an NRO staff activity rather than a CIA operation functioning under NRO direction.

Consideration should be given to directing NRO to revert to the original concept covered in the Agreement which assigns to it responsibility to plan, manage, budget and administer the reconnaissance program utilizing available resources of DoD, CIA, NSA, contractors, etc. for performance of the effort. Except for the reference in I-B, "will establish as a separate operating agency", the basic Agreement on the NRP deals exclusively in the language of management and planning.

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II. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.

Guidance to the DNRO shall be furnished by SecDef as Executive Agent and by the USIB (II-D), and the plans developed shall respond directly and solely to the intelligence collection requirements and priorities established by the USIB.

USIB's requirements are developed by its Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), composed of representatives of the Services, DIA, CIA, etc. USIB regularly reviews and passes upon COMOR's requirements.

A recent communication to DCI from DNRO dated August 12th (withdrawn August 19th) evidences a lack of understanding by NRO of the above fundamental responsibility of USIB in the field of reconnaissance.

The responsibility of DNRO to the intelligence requirements as defined by USIB should be clearly understood.

III. RELATIONSHIP OF DNRO TO SECDEF AND DCI.

The Director of NRO is charged with the responsibility of keeping designated personnel in DoD and CIA personally informed on a regular basis concerning the status of projects of the NRP so that such individuals may in turn inform the SecDef and DCI concerning these activities (V-A-1). All departments are charged with the responsibility of providing support to the DNRO through the assignment of personnel, etc.

For several months General Carter has been acting for the DCI on NRO matters. It has been concluded that all such activities will be centered within CIA with the Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Dr. Wheelon, who will be responsible to the DCI, Deputy DCI and the CIA Policy Planning Group.

NOTE: Clarification of the type of National Reconnaissance Organization contemplated by the agreement and adherence thereto now existent would solve many of the problems.

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1. Basically NRO's functions can be divided into the following general categories of activity, each of which involves planning, management, budgeting and control of activities to be assigned to agencies equipped to carry on the work directly or through contractors:

a. Research and development of improved or advanced reconnaissance systems.

b. Procurement, manufacture and testing of approved vehicles or systems.

c. Technical direction and operations control of developed systems or vehicles.

With reference to specific projects, the following problems warrant immediate resolution:

The U-2 program. To meet our needs in Cuba high resolution cameras are needed for the U-2. [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] Appropriate arrangements should be made to install and test the camera and, if successful, sufficient planes should be equipped for utilization in Cuba and perhaps elsewhere. CIA is now planning the camera installation in a test plane in early September.

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2. The OXCART program.

This includes the OXCART (A-12), the [redacted] (5 reconnaissance vehicles, two of which will be modified for TAGBOARD), KEDLOCK (3 long-range interceptors), the R-12 (reconnaissance bomber version), and TAGBOARD (the OXCART drone).

None of these programs will succeed unless the OXCART is brought up to dependable, satisfactory operation at specification, speed and altitude and this must be done without interruption. Because of the large number of projects at Lockheed under diverse management and Lockheed's understandable desire to give preference to the planes offering the greatest potential business, there has been evidence of conflicts, confusion, diversion of personnel, engines, equipment, etc. between the various projects.

It was agreed in a meeting with the President's Scientific Advisory Board, Secretary McNamara and DCI, and the President, on 21 January 1963 that procurement of the military versions of the OXCART would be handled by CIA under "black purchasing procedures." This has been done but management control of the projects after the contracts have been let is confused.

3. It is recognized that the Air Force has a very important technical input into all military vehicles, CIA a technical input to the A-12.

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It is therefore proposed that a CIA representative serve as the Managing Agent for all work at Lockheed, that this responsibility extend to placement of contracts, management of contracts, control of schedules and priorities and the adjudication of problems which arise in the plant and at the test site.

The Air Force Systems Command or other Air Force units will assign technical personnel necessary to insure that the contractor meets their technical requirements for the military vehicle (not the A-12). A system must be developed to accommodate technical changes, orders or additions, proper handling of change order contracts, extras, and reimbursement and proper accountability therefore.

A related problem is the purchase of spare parts and supplies for the OXCART vehicle and the military counterparts. This should be handled through the above contract procedures with the Air Force specifying their requirements for the military vehicles.

The above procedure will be reviewed when the A-12 vehicles have been delivered and the total Lockheed production is devoted to Air Force planes. There should be no delay in TAGBOARD. The unresolved question of the disposition of 5 Air Force A-12s [redacted] two of which are to be modified to handle TAGBOARD should be resolved and appropriate instructions issued.

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5. Technical direction and operational control of the U-2s used for reconnaissance over denied territory (except for Cuba) and the OXCART will be carried on by CIA in accordance with the programs of the NRO designed to meet the requirements of USIB. Support for these operations will be supplied by the Air Force as in the past.

6. Satellite Vehicles:

All satellite vehicles are considered as part of Project A under the responsibility of General Greer. This should remain unchanged. Satellite Operations Control Center should be moved back into CIA because of the availability of necessary computers for mission planning (which ~~are now~~ when will be employed ~~with~~ the information transmitted by Telex to the Pentagon), and also because of the close relationship with COMOR which is of vital importance in planning missions.

7. Responsibility for satellite payloads for ARGON and CORONA, ~~and LANYARD~~, including contracting and budgeting, security and technical direction to be carried on by CIA who have been responsible for these developments. Similarly responsibility for [redacted] 25X1 launch will be carried on by the Air Force in the appropriate command, all under the direction of the DNRO. and with CIA providing Security.

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8. A schedule of satellite launchings of the various types of payloads available and for as far in the future as is possible should be developed by DNRO and submitted to USIB for approval. Deviation from approved schedules should be reported on a current basis. Recognizing that the budget implications of satellite launchings are most serious, there should be frequent consultation between the DNRO and DCI in the preparation of launching schedules with the attendant budget implications to insure that the schedules as finally submitted by DNRO for incorporation in the National Reconnaissance Plan will meet the general requirements laid down by USIB.

9. Photographic Processing Research and Development; Film Procurement and Photographic Processing should be assigned by DNRO to the operating agencies in parallel to their respective responsibilities for "payloads". Note - Problems which have arisen through the duplication of contracts for Photographic Process R&D between General Greer and CIA should be adjudicated. It should be recognized that both CIA and the Air Force, directly or through their respective contractors, can make an important contribution in the field of satellite photography, film improvement, photographic processing, etc., and arrangements must be worked out, as a matter of policy and to be consistent with the basic NRO agreement, to "make maximum use of technical and operational capabilities of both".

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10. The Aircraft Operational Center located in CIA and used for planning U-2 flights and other penetrations of denied territory except for Cuba [redacted] missions, should remain centered in CIA where it has been for the past 8 years. The Cuban overflights [redacted] should be handled by JRC under DNRO guidance and in accordance with agreed procedures.

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An important area for which no plans are existent is the handling of future developments of a type which will have a very important bearing on our reconnaissance capability in the years ahead. This area of activity can not be left unattended. The areas for consideration are:

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b. The implementation of the Purcell report involving recommendations concerning the improvements of the CORONA system (now under study by both CIA and Gen. Greer), [redacted]

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RECOMMENDATION:

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c. Technical direction and operational control of developed system or vehicles.

With reference to specific projects, we must consider:

a. The U-2 program. To meet our needs in Cuba higher resolution cameras are needed for the U-2. [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] Appropriate arrangements should be made to install and test the camera and, if successful, to equip u sufficient planes for utilization in Cuba and perhaps elsewhere.

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b. The OXCART program. This includes the OXCART (A-12), the [redacted] (5 reconnaissance vehicles, two of which will be modified for TAGBOARD), KEDLOCK (3 long-range interceptors), the R-12 (reconnaissance bomber version), and TAGBOARD (the OXCART drone). 25X1

None of these programs will succeed unless the OXCART is brought up to dependable, satisfactory operation at specifications, speed and altitude and this must be done without interruption. Because of the large number of projects at Lockheed and Lockheed's understandable desire to give preference to the planes offering the greatest potential business, there has been evidence of conflicts, confusion, diversion of personnel, engines, equipment, etc. between the various projects.

It was agreed in a meeting with the President's Scientific Advisory Board, Secretary McNamara and DCI, and the President, on 21 January 1963 that procurement of the military versions of the OXCART would be handled by CIA under "black purchasing procedures". This has been done but management control of the projects after the contracts have been let is confused. It is recognized that the Air Force has a very important technical input ~~as~~ to all military vehicles, CIA a technical input to the A-12.

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It is therefore proposed that a CIA representative serve as the Managing Agent for all work at Lockheed, that his responsibility extend to placement of contracts, management of contracts, control of schedules and priorities and the adjudication of problems which arise in the plant and at the test site.

The Air Force Systems Command or other Air Force units will assign technical personnel necessary to insure that the contractor meets all of their requirements. A system must be developed to accommodate technical changes and evolutionary developments with respect to change order contracts, extras, and reimbursement therefore.

4. A related problem is the purchase of spare parts and supplies for the OXCART vehicle and the military counterparts. This should be handled through the above contract procedures with the Air Force specifying their requirements for the military vehicles.

The above procedure will be reviewed when the A-12 vehicles have been delivered and the total Lockheed production is devoted to Air Force planes. There should be no delay in TAGBOARD. Technical direction and operational control of the U-2 and OXCART to be carried on by CIA as required by DNRO, with support from the Air Force. The unresolved question of the 5 Air Force

25X1 A-12s [redacted] transferred to CIA, two of which are to be

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modified to handle TAGBOARD, should be resolved and appropriate instructions issued.

5. Satellite Vehicles: All satellite vehicles are considered as part of Project A under the responsibility of General Greer. This should remain unchanged. Satellite Operations Control Center should be moved back into CIA because of the availability of necessary computers for mission planning (which are now employed with the information transmitted by Telex to the Pentagon), and also because of the close relationship with COMOR which is of vital importance in planning missions.

6. Responsibility for satellite payloads for ARGON, CORONA, and LANYARD, including contracting and budgeting, security and technical direction to be carried on by CIA who have been responsible for these developments. Similarly responsibility [redacted] 25X1 will be carried on by the Air Force in the appropriate command, all under the direction of the DNRO.

7. A schedule of satellite launchings of the various types of payloads available and for as far in the future as is possible should be developed by DNRO and submitted to USIB for approval. Deviation from approved schedules should be reported on a current basis.

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8. Photographic processing, research and development, film procurement and photographic processing should be assigned to the active agencies in parallel to their respective responsibilities for payloads. Problems which have arisen through the duplication of contracts for photographic process R & D between Gen. Greer and CIA should be adjudicated. It should be recognized that both CIA and the Air Force through the capabilities of their respective contractors can make an important contribution in the field of satellite photography, film improvement, photographic processing, etc., and arrangements should be worked out, consistent with basic NRO agreement, to "make maximum use of technical and operational capabilities of both".

9. The Aircraft Operational Center located in CIA and used for planning U-2 flights and other penetrations of denied territory except for Cuba [redacted] should remain centered in CIA where it has been for the past 8 years. The Cuban overflights [redacted] should be handled by JRC under DNRO guidance.

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10. Future developments. An important area remains unresolved - one for which no plans are existent - the future developments which will have a very important bearing on our reconnaissance capability in

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the future. This area of activity can not be left unattended. The areas for consideration are:

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b. The implementation of the Purcell report involving recommendations concerning the improvement of the CORONA system now under study by both CIA and Gen. Greer,

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c. Satellite vulnerability which was a problem discussed at the Special Group early this year with a report requested from the Air Force.

d. Covert satellite - Subject discussed with the Special Group early this year but no specific action taken.

11. It is my intention to attempt to convene the Purcell Panel during the week of September 9 with the purpose of further reviewing their report and recommendations and seeking

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their advice on the adequacy of steps either taken or planned by NRO to accomplish the improvements recommended by them.

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22 August 1963

DD/S&T VIEW ON NRO PROBLEM

A. Reference Points

In discussing the NRO problem, the following assertions form my point of departure. They are either self-evident, a matter of record, or personal conviction based on reliable secondhand reporting.

1. Were it not for CIA there would today be no U-2, CORONA or OXCART (self-evident).

2. CIA has a demonstrated ability to identify and pursue - both aggressively and successfully - reconnaissance programs which are responsive to national intelligence needs (self-evident).

3. In addition, each of the Armed Services have a valid need for stand-by reconnaissance capabilities to be used in tactical or strategic warfare situations. These systems may or may not be logical follow-outs of national reconnaissance programs (self-evident).

4. The Air Force objective - as repeatedly stated by General LeMay - is to eliminate the CIA from all reconnaissance operations (record).

5. If exploited, the present NRO Agreement provides the enabling legislation by which CIA can be so eliminated, giving to the

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DNRO as it does the power to reassign programs (record).

6. By successive choice, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office has come to be identified with the Under Secretary of the Air Force, thereby posing an unparalleled conflict of interest question (opinion).

7. It is clear that CIA participation in the National Reconnaissance Program has decreased steadily and significantly since the beginning of the NRO (self-evident).

8. From the beginning, the NRO staff has been composed almost exclusively of Air Force officers. Their advice to the DNRO has consistently supported the erosion of CIA participation (opinion).

9. Colonel Geary, who was once responsible solely for the essential Air Force support to CIA aircraft operations, is now also responsible for competitive aircraft development programs under Air Force aegis, viz., [redacted] KEDLOCK, SAC, U-2, etc. (matter of record). 25X1

10. Resource allocation at Lockheed, Burbank, is sorely strained between OXCART and the Air Force follow-on aircraft. With no adequate mechanism to resolve schedule conflicts between CIA (Ledford) and the

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Air Force (Geary) (self-evident).

11. In the development of satellite reconnaissance systems, CIA is now utilized by General Greer for only two purposes: (a) to lend its extraordinary contracting authorities, and (b) to carry the security responsibility for the covert portion of his programs (record).

12. Contractors in all phases of the satellite reconnaissance development field now look upon General Greer and the Air Force as their sole benefactor. This follows from his assumption of technical direction responsibility for all such programs, hard on the heels of the satellite operation center transfer and our compliance in this assumption (opinion).

13. The Director of NRO feels no immediate responsibility to COMOR. He candidly asserts that COMOR has not provided - and is not able by its constitution to provide - him with meaningful guidance (direct quotation).

14. The DNRO sincerely believes that his is a line responsibility running directly to Colonel Ledford in CIA. He evidently considers it our responsibility to supply adequate resources to Colonel Ledford to carry out assigned tasks to him by DNRO (record/quotation).

15. The DNRO considers his decision on program allocation or

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reassignment final, and states that their challenge is unacceptable.

16. There is an important asymmetry between the way Dr. McMillan works with General Carter and the way he works with Dr. Fubini. Fubini participates in the making of all decisions and initiates many. General Carter is presented only with final decisions which he is enjoined not to reverse (record).

B. Recommendations

In view of this extraordinary and continuing situation, I recommend for your consideration that the following drastic steps be taken to restore and preserve the original intent of the National Reconnaissance Program:

1. Responsibility for all reconnaissance operations - both satellite and aircraft - be removed from the NRO and be assumed by the Director of Central Intelligence as the Executive Agent. This would involve the following specific steps:

a. Return of the Satellite Operations Center to CIA.

b. Retention of the Aircraft Operations Center in CIA, with the exception that overt military flights, such as [redacted] 25X1 BRASS KNOB, be planned and operated from JRC/SAC.

c. Establish a scheduling board in CIA which would manage both the satellite launch schedules and aircraft flights. General Greer would be tasked to establish direct communication with this

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board and station appropriate representatives from his organization with it, so that the scheduling board could plan satellite launches in light of the physical limitations of booster procurement, stand availability and range facilities. This scheduling board would be responsive to USIB/COMOR and the DCI. It would carry to the Special Group explicit plans for aircraft and satellite reconnaissance operations.

d. Detailed planning for all covert aircraft operations would be carried out by the CIA Aircraft Operations Center. Satellite operations would be planned in detail jointly by the Satellite Operations Center and the operating facilities under General Greer (Satellite Tracking Center) on the West Coast.

e. Film processing for both satellite and aircraft operations would be managed directly by the CIA in response to DCI and USIB requirements. Both CIA and Air Force facilities/contractors would be exploited in this program, but the over-all management and scheduling would be carried out by CIA as an intricate part of the entire reconnaissance operations activity.

f. CIA would take the lead in photographic equipment development such as the present Eastman Kodak R&D contract.

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The results of such development would have immediate application to NPIC and the film processing centers. However, the Air Force should be an active partner in all such programs to insure that the collateral benefits for its tactical and strategic reconnaissance can be promptly recognized and exploited.

2. The DNRO should officially drop his claims to line authority over the elements contributing to the NRP. Specifically, Col. Ledford should work for CIA in the person of the DD/S&T. The latter would be responsible to see that the CIA responsibility to the NRP is adequately carried out and that our assignments are properly discharged and supported. 25X

a. The conception and primary design of new systems, both satellite and aircraft, based on the intelligence requirements of the DCI/USIB and the technological advances being made by the DOD/AF.

b. This joint approach to new programs should continue through the selection of contractors and framing of system

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specifications so that (1) the AF can take advantage of reconnaissance developments for its other purposes, and (2) CIA can contribute effectively even in areas where it is not appropriate for it to carry major development responsibility.

c. An explicit assignment of development responsibility for a new system should then be made to either the AF, the Navy, the Army, CIA [redacted] 25X1

d. The responsible agency or service should fund for the program, contract for it, carry the technical management and be responsible for the security in the program. The DCI should cease to lend his extraordinary contracting authority to the AF for programs over which he has no cognizance and should no longer carry security responsibility in widely dispersed industrial plants for similar programs.

4. Specific Program Assignment Recommendations:

a. Technical management of the CORONA and ARGON payloads be transferred back to CIA.

b. Technical management of LANYARD [redacted] be given to the AF. 25X1

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d. CIA retain the technical management of TAGBOARD because of its intimate technical and schedule interaction with the OXCART vehicle.

e. Over-all management of the Lockheed, Burbank, effort and priorities be vested in CIA so as to insure that the OXCART reconnaissance vehicle is not placed in competition with large potential orders for the long range interceptor version.

f. Responsibility for follow-on aircraft to the OXCART system be clearly assigned at this time to the CIA, to be pursued jointly with the AF.

g. Responsibility for developing a covert satellite, if such a system makes sense, be explicitly assigned at this time to the CIA.

h. Eastman Kodak film processing R&D contract be assigned to CIA in view of its major application to the film exploitation effort at NPIC and the recommended assignment of film processing management responsibility to CIA noted above.

i. A competitive role in camera development be assigned

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to both CIA and the AF with the understanding that each be a party to the other's progress in great detail for mutual benefit. CIA's demonstrated ability to push the state-of-the-art hard and fast in contrast to the AF inertia is important. The AF should be free to pursue camera development on its own initiative for programs which are under its primary responsibility, i. e., [redacted] 25X1 LANYARD, and should have immediate access to all CIA camera developments so as to recognize and implement possible application to their tactical and strategic requirements. The same should be true for the Navy and the Army.

5. CIA should fund in its own budget all of these activities which it undertakes on behalf of the NRP. The Bureau of the Budget believes and states that program control and financial control are indissolubly linked. In my view, our experience in the NRO shows that they are correct. A joint budget should be prepared by the AF and CIA reflecting the NRP, and the Bureau of the Budget should be encouraged to look at the total package in this way. However, the basic funding should be carried in the individual services in accordance with that plan. The converse of this agreement is that we no longer use our extraordinary contracting authority to fence money for other Agency programs over which we have no control.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Washington

Office of the Under Secretary

22 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA
THE DIRECTOR, NPIC

I am directing the DDNRO to make an assessment of the adequacy of photographic imaging products furnished to the intelligence community by the NRO. This is to be limited to domestically processed photographic products from NRP operations.

I would appreciate your designation of one individual each from your respective agencies, to serve in a liaison capacity to a small working group to accomplish this investigation. I am proposing that this group of three or four individuals perform their tasks via direct contact with processing and exploitation centers. Your comments on the attached preliminary outline of the study will be appreciated.

/s/

BROCKWAY McMILLAN
Director
National Reconnaissance Office

cc - Chairman USIB (COMOR)
Director, Program "A"
Director, Program "B"

Attachment

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ADEQUACY OF NRP PROCESSED PHOTOGRAPHIC PRODUCTS

PURPOSE:

1. Determine and report the views of principal users of processed photographic products of the NRP as to adequacy of these products for their purposes. Items of concern are:

a. Uniformity of quality

b. Quantities received

c. Timeliness of receipt

d. Adequacy of auxiliary data

e. Suitability of format

f. Division of processing between NRO general purpose facilities and individual user special purpose facilities.

2. Examine the procedures now used to assess and report quality, and their contribution to the control of quality.

APPROACH:

Assessment and evaluation of current products, of user's views regarding those products, and of methods and practices, by very small group of NRO personnel via direct contacts at processing centers and user installations. Coordination should be established with USIB, COMOR, DIA, as appropriate.

Establish liaison directly, and also via NRO staff participation on present Ad Hoc CORONA MURAL Quality Improvement Working Group. The assessment directed here should make use of, but not duplicate, activities of that Group; findings of this evaluation may be of some use to that Group.

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RESULT:

Findings in the form of recommendations for continuance or changes to present ways and means of supplying processed photographic products of the NRP to principal users, should be reported to the DNRO.

Any changes required to improve the assessment and reporting of quality, in order to insure continuned quality control, should be pointed out.

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26 April 1965

NRO History file

AGREEMENT FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

I. PREAMBLE

Set forth below are certain basic assumptions which determine the organization appropriate for the administration and direction of the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP).

A. The national character of this essential intelligence enterprise must be maintained through a joint endeavor on the part of DoD and CIA.

B The potentialities of U.S technology must be aggressively and imaginatively exploited to develop systems for the collection of intelligence which are fully responsive to intelligence needs and objectives. In the development of new systems maximum use must be made of the experience, resources, facilities and technical competence of appropriate components of the Defense Department and CIA.

C. Scheduling and targetting of satellite and manned aircraft reconnaissance missions over denied areas shall be the final responsibility of the DCI and the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

D A new organizational framework is required which, particularly in the field of satellite reconnaissance operations and systems development, will: (1) provide a clearly established delineation of the roles and responsibilities of components of the Government engaged in these activities, and (2) ensure effective coordination of these activities under centralized policy guidance and control.

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II. ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK:

A. THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

An Executive Committee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, will be established to formulate, guide, and regulate the NRP. Specifically the Executive Committee will:

1. Establish an appropriate level of effort for the NRP in response to reconnaissance requirements provided by USIB and in the light of technical capabilities and fiscal limitations.

2. Approve or modify the consolidated NR program and its budget.

3. Acting through the DNR, allocate responsibility and the corresponding funds to CIA and/or DOD for research and preliminary design studies for new systems.

4. Allocate development responsibilties and the corresponding funds for specific reconnaissance programs to DOD or CIA, and establish guidelines for mutual support where appropriate. It shall be free to use technical advisory groups as necessary.

5. Assign operational responsibilities to either DoD or CIA for various types of manned overflight missions, subject to the concurrence, of the 303 Committee.

6. Review periodically the essential features of the major program elements of the NRP.

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B. ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE:

To insure the coordination of CIA and DOD reconnaissance activities a Director of National Reconnaissance Program will be appointed by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence. The D/NR will serve for a four-year term and will be selected by the Secretary of Defense and concurred in by the Director of Central Intelligence from CIA, DOD, or from other sources. He will be responsible to and carry out the directives of the Executive Committee. He will devote his activities exclusively to the NRP and will have no other official duties. Specifically he will:

1. Provide a single point of integration for the planning and budgeting of the National Reconnaissance Program and will be responsible to the Executive Committee for the execution of the program.

2. Be kept fully and completely informed of all reconnaissance activities in CIA and DOD.

3. Schedule the use of the space launching, tracking and recovery facilities.

4. Review budget proposals submitted by appropriate elements of CIA and DOD and prepare and submit a consolidated budget for examination and approval by the Executive Committee.

5. Ensure the flow of funds from the NRP appropriations to CIA and appropriate DOD elements in lump sum transfers each fiscal year. Incremental funding from reserve or reprogramming sources will be used for supplemental programs approved by ExCom.

6. Deal with the operating head of the CIA or his designated alternate on all matters of policy, coordination, or guidance. He will not exercise command control over subordinate elements of CIA or its personnel, however, the DCI will insure that the fullest measure of cooperation is afforded the D/NR.

7. Sit with the USIB for the matters affecting the NRP.

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8. Appear before the 303 Committee to the extent desired by the DCI or the Deputy Secretary of Defense to secure approval for overhead reconnaissance missions.

C. MANNING OF THE REORGANIZED NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM:

To insure that the National Reconnaissance Program is truly a national entity, it will be manned in a balanced way by personnel from DOD and CIA. An appropriate plan to rotate DOD and CIA personnel into key positions of the NRP will be developed and approved by the ExCom. (Attached is chart showing key senior positions of NRP.)

III. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE NRP:

A. RESEARCH AND PRELIMINARY DESIGN:

1. Research on reconnaissance technology and preliminary design of new systems will be encouraged and supported in both CIA and DOD. It will be supported by a lump sum allocation from NRP budget line items to each group at a level to be recommended by the DRP and approved by the Executive Committee. It is intended that these funds and their products represent the flexible cutting edge of the NRP.

2. A prescribed amount of these resources will be allocated for support of basic research on reconnaissance technology to stimulate and assure the future vigor of this field. The DNR will be kept fully informed of all activities and developments in this connection for the purpose of ensuring appropriate coordination and preventing unwitting duplication as well as encouraging joint exploitation of new techniques.

3. Preliminary design and small technical feasibility demonstrations of new reconnaissance systems will also be funded from this innovation resource. Such work can grow out of requirements originating with USIB, the ExCom or the DNR for improvements in existing capabilities, or can result from spontaneous initiative in the CIA and DOD participating elements. However, it is important that the DNR and ExCom receive each month a comprehensive report on the initiation, status, or conclusion of such efforts. In this way, competitive study efforts will be recognized, approved or discouraged, and synchronized for later decision actions.

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B. SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT:

1. When a new reconnaissance system concept has been approved for development by ExCom, with appropriate recommendations by the D/NR, it will be assigned as a specific program of the NRP in whole or part to either CIA or DOD. This assignment will include the transfer of funds necessary for the development, production, and procurement envisioned, in whatever increments ExCom considers are appropriate to the proper management of the program.

2. The element of CIA and/or DOD assigned such development, production and procurement responsibility for a new system will be responsible for selecting and supervising contractors; for establishing such systems engineering support as they deem necessary; for rendering periodic reports on program progress to the D/NR and ExCom and generally for the implementation of the program.

C. SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS:

1. When a satellite reconnaissance payload has been developed, it becomes a part of the operational assets of the NRP. Such payloads, together with appropriate rocket boosters, launch facilities, tracking/communication networks, and recovery forces must be combined in an orderly program to acquire intelligence information in response to USIB requirements. The conduct of this operational satellite reconnaissance program will be the responsibility of the D/NR.

2. The D/NR will establish a launching schedule for all satellite reconnaissance payloads in response to expressed USIB requirements. The D/NR will ensure that adequate launch vehicles and payloads are procured to meet this schedule and recommend budget levels in CIA and DOD

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to support this procurement. We will also support payload development flights with launch support and schedule such tests so as to be compatible with the basic operational schedule for acquisition of intelligence.

3. The DOD will create a single satellite reconnaissance operational organization which will be responsible for the launch, command and tracking and recovery phases of all satellite operations.

4. Satellite payloads for the program will be procured by the agencies responsible for their development and improvement. The components of these payloads will be accepted, assembled, tested, and programmed by the developing agency at suitable facilities near the launching site. These payloads will then be provided to the launching organization as certified equipment ready for flight on the schedule established by the D/NR.

5. The Satellite Requirements Program Center, formerly known as "Satellite Operations Center," shall be responsive to USIB requirements and will function as the responsibility of CIA. It has the responsibility of providing the operational mission intelligence guidance, i.e., final orbit choice, camera programming, etc.

B. MANNED OVERFLIGHT OPERATION:

1. Covert manned overflights of denied areas will be the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency. These missions will be planned in the Air Operations Center of CIA in response to USIB target coverage requirements with the approval of the 303 Committee. The D/NR will be kept fully informed of such planning and operations. Within the constraints established by the 303 group, these missions will be executed by CIA in the light of target and terminal weather, negotiations for overseas base use and defensive tactics necessary for operational survival. The DOD will continue to support such operations with airlifts, tankers, and base equipment in accordance with the basic U-2 and OXCART agreements.

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2. Overt manned overflights of denied territory or overt missions covering friendly territory will generally be executed by the DoD to meet established intelligence requirements unless otherwise directed by the 303 Committee. The Joint Reconnaissance Center of the JCS will plan the missions in response to USIB and/or field command target requirements. JRC will be responsible for executing such missions with the approval of the 303 Committee. The JRC will keep the D/NR fully informed on all such mission planning and execution. The CIA will support JRC in negotiations on overseas bases, providing secure communications, and security support as requested.

3. The designation of particular classes of manned overflight operations as overt or covert will be the responsibility of the ExCom in consultation with the 303 Committee, as noted above.

E. SECURITY:

The Director of Central Intelligence, in accordance with his statutory responsibilities for protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall be responsible for the overall security policy of the NRP. The D/NR will be responsible for the coordination of security matters within the respective elements of the NRP in accordance with the guidelines set forth by the Executive Committee. Release of public information shall be coordinated with the DCI. The CIA shall maintain a central record of all security clearances related to the NRP.

F. BUDGETING:

A separate National Reconnaissance Program funding agreement will be entered into and made a part of this agreement.

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

The Assistant Deputies would constitute the action and information channels to their respective parent services.

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